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1. Introduction
Annuities can be a valuable form of insurance against the possibility of exhausting financial
resources or having to severely curtail retirement consumption. Nevertheless, there is relatively
little demand for these insurance products (Mitchell, Piggott, and Takayama, 2011; Poterba, Venti,
and Wise, 2011). A voluminous literature reviewed in Brown (2009) explores rational explanations
for why observed levels of annuitization are much lower than predicted by standard optimizing
models such as those by Yaari (1965) and Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005). Recent
contributions to this literature include several papers that combine multiple deviations from the
standard optimizing framework. For instance, Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2011), Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro, and Tonetti (2018), and Lockwood (2012, 2018) explain
observed low annuity demand using structural models that combine a precautionary savings
motive (for long-term care expenses when there is public care aversion) with a bequest motive;
Reichling and Smetters (2015) do so as well by introducing stochastic mortality and correlated
uninsured health care costs. Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker (2017) show that medical
expenditure risk can rationalize low observed annuitization levels early in retirement, but not why
many older people fail to buy annuities. Finally, Laitner, Silverman, and Stolyarov (2018) show
analytically how the presence of implicit longevity insurance provided by Medicaid nursing home
care can crowd out demand for annuities for the lower and middle classes.
A different strand of literature explores whether behavioral factors help explain low
observed levels of annuitization. Several hypothetical choice experiments suggest that behavioral
factors influence the demand for annuities, including studies showing that framing of the annuity
choice affects the demand for annuities (Brown, Kling, Mullainathan, and Wrobel, 2008, 2013;
Beshears, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Zeldes, 2014; Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell, 2016;
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Merkle, Schreiber, and Weber, 2017; and Bockweg, Ponds, Steenbeek and Vonken, 2018). Similar
findings emerge in incentivized laboratory settings (Agnew, Anderson, Gerlach, and Szykman,
2008; Gazzale and Walker, 2011). Another source of evidence is research demonstrating that
individuals in a hypothetical choice setting provide widely divergent valuations for small increases
versus small decreases in annuitization amounts (Brown, Kapteyn, Luttmer, and Mitchell, 2017).
This latter result is consistent with people having trouble assessing the value of an annuity stream
and therefore requiring a high selling price and offering a low buying price, as they are reluctant
to trade what they do not understand. There is also suggestive evidence from non-hypothetical
choices that points to behavioral mechanisms. For instance, in 10 Swiss firms, Bütler and Teppa
(2007) show that annuitization rates are much higher on average in the firms that offer an annuity
as the default payout option than in the one firm paying out a lump sum as the default. This finding
suggests that annuitization rates are influenced by the default, implying a deviation from a standard
rational model. Similarly, Hagen, Hallberg, and Lindquist (2018) show that a nudge affects
annuitization decisions of Swedish pensioners. Other papers finding patterns in observed
annuitization choices suggestive of deviations from rational choice models include Hurd and Panis
(2006), Chalmers and Reuter (2012), Previtero (2014), and Fitzpatrick (2015). Shepard (2011) and
Bronshtein, Scott, Shoven, and Slavov (2016) use arbitrage arguments to show that, for many
people, the annuitization decision implicit in when to claim Social Security benefits cannot be fully
explained by a standard rational model.
Although rational models can be constructed to match the low observed demand for
annuities, our take from the literature on the annuity puzzle is that behavioral factors remain
operative. In short, we share Brown’s (2009, p. 185) assessment that while “it is possible to
generate more limited annuitization by extending the rational model in several directions, such an

2

approach does not seem to provide the complete answer to the puzzle” of low observed levels of
annuitization. Similarly, Benartzi, Previtero, and Thaler (2011, p.161) conclude that the “tiny
market share of individual annuities should not be viewed as an indicator of underlying preferences
but rather as a consequence of institutional factors about the availability and framing of annuity
options.”
Many studies find that behavioral factors influence annuitization decisions, yet relatively
little is known about the mechanisms driving this behavior. Brown et al. (2008, 2013) report that
presenting annuities in terms of the consumption streams they generate leads to higher annuity
demand than presenting annuities as investment products. Brown et al. (2008) suggest that the
adoption of a narrow decision frame, also referred to as choice bracketing (Thaler, 1985; Read,
Loewenstein, and Rabin, 1999), may drive this finding: that is, people evaluate annuities based on
the return and variance of the payouts in isolation rather than by focusing on the level and variance
of the consumption stream flowing from the annuity (which is what matters for utility). It remains
a leap of faith, however, to infer that the choice is more rational simply because demand is higher.
Brown et al. (2017) establish that the deviation from rational choice, measured by the gap between
peoples’ sell versus buy prices for annuities, is lower for individuals with better cognition scores.
The authors take this as suggestive evidence that valuing annuities is cognitively challenging
because it is a complex task. Nevertheless, they do not claim that this is causal evidence of a
mechanism, as they lack exogenous variation in the complexity of the annuitization decision.
In the present paper, we produce stronger evidence on behavioral mechanisms that may
affect the annuitization decision. Rather than asking for a respondent’s own hypothetical
annuitization decision, we first describe a vignette where a hypothetical person faces an annuity
decision, and we then ask our respondents to advise that vignette person. This alternative way of
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eliciting hypothetical annuitization choices allows us to experimentally vary characteristics of the
vignette person that affect the complexity of the annuitization decision while holding the
characteristics of the annuity itself constant. The annuitization decision faced by the vignette
person is a choice between a lump sum amount and a change in Social Security benefits. We use
the stream of Social Security benefits as the annuity in our experiment for two reasons. First, most
respondents are aware that Social Security payments last as long as they live (Greenwald, Kapteyn,
Mitchell, and Schneider, 2010), which means they understand that Social Security provides an
annuity even if they do not understand the term “annuity.” 1 Second, because Social Security is a
widely held annuity, it is natural to ask both about the value of decreases and increases in Social
Security benefits, which allows us to measure the divergence between sell and buy valuations of
the annuity. This divergence is our measure of deviations from rational decision-making because
rational individuals should value a marginal increase in the Social Security annuity the same as a
marginal decrease.
Specifically, we present respondents of the nationally representative Understanding
America Study (UAS) with a vignette in which a hypothetical person faces a choice between
receiving a $100 per month increase in Social Security benefits versus receiving a lump sum
amount. We ask each respondent what the vignette person should choose and repeat the question
for various values of the lump sums until we find the lump sum deemed equivalent in value to a
$100 per month increase in the Social Security annuity. We call this lump sum amount the “sell”
valuation because the respondent advises the vignette person to sell a $100 a month annuity for
this lump sum. At a different point in the experiment, we ask each respondent to advise the same
vignette person on a choice between a $100 per month decrease in Social Security benefits versus
While policy risk reduces people’s valuation of the stream of Social Security benefits (Luttmer and Samwick, 2018),
this should reduce both the buy and sell valuation, leaving their differential unaffected.

1
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paying a lump sum. The lump sum amount that is valued as much as the decrease in benefits is the
“buy” valuation, as it represents the amount of money the respondent advises the vignette person
to pay to avoid forfeiting a $100 per month annuity. We refer to the absolute difference between
the log sell valuation and the log buy valuation as the “sell-buy spread,” and we use this to measure
deviations from rational decision-making.
We introduce two experimental interventions to test for two types of behavioral
impediments to valuing annuities. 2 First, we vary the ease by which an annuity stream can be
valued, which we refer to as the complexity of the annuitization choice. 3 Valuing an annuity stream
is more difficult when there is greater uncertainty about longevity. We experimentally manipulate
this uncertainty by telling the respondent what longevity information the vignette person received
from a doctor. Valuing an annuity is also more difficult when the description of the annuity
contains additional information that turns out to be irrelevant but nevertheless requires effort to
process. This is an alternative means by which we vary complexity. Second, we independently
randomize whether or not the respondent receives information about the benefits and drawbacks
of spending down non-annuitized wealth during retirement more rapidly versus more slowly. This
intervention occurs before the respondent advises the vignette person about annuitization. The
purpose of the intervention is to induce people to think about the consumption consequences of
holding an annuity during retirement. The “consequence message” intervention therefore has the
potential to be a new instrument (besides framing) to reduce the narrow choice bracketing that
Brown et al. (2008) identified as a behavioral mechanism.

As described below, we have included additional experimental interventions to test for anchoring and to test whether
results are robust. All these experimental interventions are orthogonal to the two main interventions designed to test
for behavioral impediments to valuing annuities.
3
Our reference to complexity differs from a common use of the term when describing smaller/larger choice sets, e.g.,
Carvalho and Silverman, 2019.
2
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Our experiment yields two main findings. First, we show that greater complexity causes
the sell-buy spread to increase, indicating that complexity associated with annuities reduces
people’s ability to assess the value of an annuity. This is the first causal evidence of complexity as
a mechanism that impedes valuing annuities, and we consider this to be the first main contribution
of our paper. This result supports the interpretation offered by Brown et al. (2017) that the
cognitive challenge of assessing the value of an annuity makes people reluctant to either buy or
sell an annuity, leading to a low buy price but a high sell price. Our finding is consistent with
results from other contexts documenting that complexity reduces people’s responsiveness to
incentives or the quality of their decision-making, including in work decisions (Abeler and Jäger,
2015), portfolio choice (Carlin, Kogan, and Lowery, 2013; Carvalho and Silverman, 2019), benefit
claiming (Bhargava and Manoli, 2015), and the selection of health insurance plans (Schram and
Sonnemans, 2011; Besedeš, Deck, Sarangi, and Shor, 2012a, b). Different from most of this work,
which manipulates complexity by providing a larger or smaller choice set, we manipulate
complexity by making it more or less difficult to map the information offered about the annuity to
the consequences or outcomes from buying or selling it.
Our second result is that the “consequence message” intervention reduces the sell-buy
spread. In other words, people are better able to assess the value of an annuity if they think about
the effect of the annuity on the distribution of their future consumption streams versus when they
do not make this connection. This finding supports Brown et al. (2008, 2013) on the role of choice
bracketing in annuity decisions. Yet unlike that study, here we measure a deviation from rational
decision-making by the discrepancy between the buy and sell price of a small change in annuitized
wealth, which is a more objective indicator of lack of rational decision-making than simply the
level of annuitization. We consider this additional evidence on choice bracketing the second main
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contribution of this paper, and our finding adds to the growing empirical evidence on choice
bracketing based on experimental variation in the breadth of the decision frame. For example,
Bertrand and Morse (2011) report that people take out smaller payday loans when they are
experimentally induced to think more broadly about the consequences of taking out such loans,
and Enke (2017) shows that people develop more accurate beliefs when they are experimentally
induced to adopt broader mental frames. 4
Evidence that behavioral mechanisms affect annuitization decisions has the important
implication that one cannot infer how much people value annuities by simply observing their
annuitization decisions. Specifically, the fact that observed voluntary annuitization levels are low
does not necessarily imply that utility-maximizing levels of annuitization are also low. In light of
behavioral mechanisms affecting annuitization decisions, the fact that Social Security pays out
benefits exclusively as an annuity is particularly valuable to people that would otherwise
underannuitize.
Evidence that complexity impedes annuitization decisions has the important implication
that reducing complexity can improve individuals’ annuitization decisions. While it may be
possible to make the decision less complex by presenting information about the annuity more
clearly, we stress that much of the complexity is inherent in the annuitization decision itself: people
need to jointly evaluate how much they will consume each future year with and without the
annuity, how much they care about consumption fluctuations, and the probability that they will be
alive in each future year. No matter how well the decision is presented, it remains a complex task.

In addition, there is compelling empirical evidence that people do not treat money as fungible. Studies showing this
include Kooreman (2000), Milkman and Beshears (2009), Feldman (2010), Hastings and Shapiro (2013), Beatty,
Blow, Crossley, and O’Dea (2014), and Abeler and Marklein (2017). While these papers do not experimentally vary
the breadth of the decision frame, a leading explanation of these findings is mental accounting, which is a form of
choice bracketing.

4
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We do find that inducing people to consider the consequences of annuitization decisions for their
consumption streams enables them to better assess the value of an annuity. This is important
because it provides clear guidance on how annuitization decisions should be presented. Still, while
the consequence message limits the degree to which choice bracketing acts as an impediment to
valuing an annuity, we emphasize that the sell-buy spread remains substantial even for those
exposed to the consequences message.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our methodology and
explains our experimental design. In Section 3, we present our empirical findings, and Section 4
concludes.

2. Methodology and Experimental Design
2.1 Understanding America Study
Our experiment uses the UAS, a probability-based Internet panel of about 6,000 adults 5
(age 18+) representative of the U.S. population. Panel members are recruited exclusively through
address-based sampling, in which invitation letters are sent to randomly selected households using
address lists obtained from the U.S. postal service. This provides a broadly representative sample,
since individuals lacking prior access to the Internet are provided with a tablet and broadband
Internet. 6 In addition, the UAS contains small oversamples (about 5% each) of Native Americans
and residents of Los Angeles County. Our experimental module was fielded between June and
October of 2016, and all UAS panel members at the time were invited to participate. Panel
members received $10 for completing the survey, which took an average of 14 minutes, and they

The description of the UAS refers to the situation at the time of the experiment. Current sample size is about 8,000
and is set to grow to 10,000.
6
An extensive discussion of the UAS is provided in Alattar, Messer, and Rogofsky (2018).
5
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could also receive additional earnings depending on their answers to quiz questions. Of the 5,521
invited panel members, 83.2% opened the link to the survey. 7 Of those who opened the link, 99.1%
completed both annuity valuation questions for an overall response rate of 82.4% (4,549
respondents).
The UAS gathers information on demographic characteristics for all respondents as well
as detailed measures of cognitive capabilities and financial literacy (the latter for about 90% of
respondents). Given that cognitive ability and financial literacy are important predictors of
responses to annuity questions, we limit our analysis sample to those observations with nonmissing
measures of cognitive ability and financial literacy. In addition, we exclude 0.5% of observations
with missing values for any demographic characteristics. The final analysis sample has 4,060
observations (89.2% of the total number of respondents who completed both the annuity sell and
buy questions).
We recognize that a drawback of hypothetical choice data is that people may not put as
much effort into making decisions as they might in real-life situations. As a result, their answers
may contain more measurement error than would be true in the real world. Nevertheless, it seems
unlikely that people can fully overcome cognitive biases simply by exerting more effort. Moreover,
concerns about the reliability of willingness-to-pay responses in the UAS are allayed by Mas and
Pallais (2017) who show that the distribution of willingness-to-pay for hypothetical flexible work
arrangements obtained in the UAS closely matches the willingness-to-pay distribution from a
similar field experiment. In our case, using hypothetical choice data has the important advantage
that we can elicit both a willingness-to-pay and a willingness-to-accept for the same person,

This response rate is typical in UAS surveys. The invitation reads “In the following survey we want you to play the
role of financial advisor. We will show you some examples of persons who have to make a decision about money and
we will ask you to help them make the decision.”
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permitting us to measure deviations from rational decision-making. We know of no field setting
that allows for the simultaneous measurements of willingness-to-pay and a willingness-to-accept
for an annuity for the same person. Moreover, in our setting, we observe the valuations of all
respondents, in contrast to most revealed preference approaches where only the valuations of
marginal individuals can be observed and the valuations of inframarginal persons can only be
bounded, absent functional form assumptions.
Online Appendix Table A1 provides summary statistics for our baseline sample and
compares it to the Current Population Survey (CPS) of the same year. Compared to the CPS, our
sample overrepresents respondents between the ages of 35 and 65 by 11 percentage points, females
by 6 percentage points, married respondents by 7 percentage points, non-Hispanic whites by 11
percentage points, individuals with more than a high school education by 16 percentage points,
households with annual incomes above $75,000 by 3 percentage points, households with two or
fewer members by 10 percentage points, and households with no children by 5 percentage points.
While these differences are generally statistically significant, the two samples are reasonably
similar in terms of economic magnitudes, with the absolute difference in the fraction of
respondents in a category being 5 percentage points on average across the 25 demographic
categories listed in the table. As such, we consider our sample to be broadly representative of the
U.S. adult population.
2.2 Experimental Context
Rather than describing an unfamiliar hypothetical annuity product, we use Social Security
benefits as the context for the analysis of payout annuities. Specifically, we asked respondents to
make trade-offs between receiving higher or lower Social Security benefits (a change in a real
annuity stream) and paying or receiving different one-time payments (lump sums). Our setting is
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policy relevant because past discussions of pension reforms around the world, including in the
U.S., have included proposals to offer workers lump sum payments in exchange for a reduction in
their annuitized pension benefits (Maurer, Mitchell, Rogalla and Tschimetschek, 2018). Several
U.S. corporations have also recently offered to buy back defined benefit pension annuities from
retirees in exchange for lump sums (Wayland, 2012).
2.3 Elicitation of the Valuation of an Annuity Stream
Throughout the experiment, we use vignettes to describe trade-offs and ask respondents to
give the hypothetical “vignette person” advice about annuitization decisions. This approach has
several attractive features. First, we can directly manipulate the complexity of the annuitization
decision by using different experimental treatments. Second, we control for the respondent’s own
characteristics: unlike making a decision for one’s own situation (as in Brown et al. 2017), we
need not worry about factors such as liquidity constraints or private knowledge that the respondent
may have about his or her own situation.
The vignette person in the control condition is described as follows:
Mr. Jones is a single, 60-year old man with no children. He will retire and claim his Social
Security benefits at 65. When he retires, he will have $100,000 saved for his retirement,
and he will receive $[SSB] in monthly Social Security benefits. Based on his current health
and family history, doctors have told Mr. Jones that he will almost certainly be alive at age
75 but almost certainly will not live beyond age 85.
The gender and name of the vignette person are experimentally varied between respondents. The
variable $[SSB] represents the vignette person’s monthly Social Security benefits, randomized
with equal probability across respondents to $800, $1,200, $1,600, and $2,000.
Our main outcome of interest is the respondent’s advice for how the hypothetical “vignette
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person” should trade off annuitized wealth and lump sum amounts at retirement. All respondents
answer a series of questions that elicit either the equivalent variation (EV) of a $100 increase in
monthly Social Security benefits or the EV of a $100 decrease in monthly Social Security benefits.
Each respondent is asked both questions, and the order in which they are asked is randomized.
The valuation of a $100 increment in the annuity stream is elicited by asking a series of
questions of the form:
What should Mr. Jones do?
(1) Receive a Social Security benefit of $[SSB+100] per month starting at age 65.
or
(2) Receive his expected Social Security benefit of $[SSB] per month and receive a one-time
payment of $[LS] from Social Security at age 65.
The $100 increment in benefits of $[SSB+100] is displayed as a single number on the screen. The
variable LS represents the lump sum amount that is traded off, randomized across respondents to
start at $10,000, $20,000 or $30,000. The question is subsequently asked four more times for
different values of LS. For example, if the person declines a $20,000 lump sum, we infer that that
the valuation must exceed $20,000, so for the next question we use a higher value of LS, namely
$60,000. If the person accepts the $20,000 lump sum, we would use a lower value of LS. Next, if
the person accepts the $60,000 lump sum, we infer that the valuation must lie below $60,000, and
we ask the question three more times to further reduce the difference between the lower and upper
bound of the person’s valuation of the $100 increment in the annuity stream. The exact sequence
of values for LS is shown in the survey instrument in the Online Appendix. We refer to this
question as the “sell” version, because the person receives a payment in exchange for a smaller
annuity stream.
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The valuation of a $100 decrease in the annuity stream is elicited by asking a series of
questions of the form:
What should Mr. Jones do?
(1) Receive a Social Security benefit of $[SSB-100] per month starting at age 65.
or
(2) Receive his expected Social Security benefit of $[SSB] per month and make a one-time
payment of $[LS] to Social Security at age 65.
As before, the question is asked five times for different values of LS until we can place the
respondent’s valuation of the annuity into one of 32 bins. We refer to this question as the “buy”
version, because the person is making a payment in exchange for a larger annuity stream.
Given that a $100 change in the annuity stream is small relative to the average monthly
benefit of $1,400, a rational respondent should value this change approximately the same, whether
it is an increase or a decrease. We therefore take the absolute difference of the sell and buy
valuations to measure the deviation from rational decision-making.
2.4 Experimental Design
Our experiment consists of a 3x2 between-subjects design, summarized in Table 1. First,
we experimentally vary what we refer to as the complexity of the vignette in one of two ways,
either by increasing the uncertainty associated with length of life (Complexity: Wide age range
treatment) or by adding extraneous information to the vignette that is not relevant to the decision
(Complexity: Added information treatment). For example, control group respondents are told that
the vignette person will “almost certainly be alive at age 75 but almost certainly will not live
beyond age 85.” By contrast, respondents in the Complexity: Wide age range treatment are told
that the vignette person “has an 80% chance of being alive at age 70, a 50% chance of being alive
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at age 80, a 20% chance of being alive at age 90, and a 10% chance of being alive at age 95.”
Determining the value of an annuity is a more complex task when the variation in possible ages of
death is more dispersed, as is the case in this second vignette. 8 The extraneous information added
to the Complexity: Added information treatment includes information about Social Security
qualification rules and describes why the vignette person qualified. Here the increased complexity
requires the respondent to think about the additional information and determine whether it is
relevant. 9
Second, prior to the advice decision, in half of the treatments we additionally provide a
message about the consequences of spending down retirement savings (Consequence message).
This message describes an interaction between a different vignette person and his or her financial
advisor. In this interaction, the advisor describes the benefits and drawbacks of spending down
savings relatively quickly (more likely to be able to use money in one’s lifetime, but running a
larger risk of running out of money while alive), versus relatively slowly (less likely to run out of
money, but running a larger risk of not getting to enjoy one’s money in one’s lifetime). This
message is framed as neutrally as possible and designed to encourage the respondent to avoid
narrow choice bracketing: by inducing respondents to think about the problem of how to spend
down wealth in retirement, we intended that respondents consider the annuitization decision and
the asset decumulation decisions jointly, rather than as disjoint decisions. To ensure that
respondents pay attention to the message, respondents are further told that, at the end of the
message, they will be asked two questions about the facts in the story and will receive an additional

This manipulation affects the amount of longevity risk, which may affect buy and sell values. However, we would
expect it to have the same effect on the buy and sell values, and therefore not affect the sell-buy spread.
9
Respondents took on average about 25% longer to read and process the vignettes of the complexity treatment than
the control vignette (“no added complexity”), and the text of vignettes of the complexity treatment required a reading
comprehension 0.9 grade levels higher, according to the Flesch-Kincaid scale.
8
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$1 for each question they answer correctly. These factual questions are two multiple choice
questions about the financial advisor’s explanation of the benefits and drawbacks under each
scenario (spending down slowly or quickly). Of the respondents who are posed these two factual
questions, 63% answer both correctly, 27% answer one correctly, and 10% answer neither
correctly.
In summary, all respondents are asked to give advice to a primary vignette person about
buying and selling a small fraction of that vignette person’s Social Security benefit stream.
Between respondents, we therefore have two main treatments: (1) the information about the
vignette person, randomized between “No added complexity”, “Complexity: Wide age range”,
and “Complexity: Added information”, and (2) whether narrow choice bracketing is discouraged,
where we randomize between “No consequence message” and “Consequence message.” In
addition, we have the following six secondary randomizations. We perform two randomizations
to test for anchoring, which is another indication of a lack of rational decision-making: (3) the
starting value for the lump sum amount ($LS=$10,000, $20,000, $30,000); and (4) the order of the
two annuity valuation questions. Finally, we randomize (5) the name and gender of the primary
vignette person (Mr. Jones, Mrs. Jones, Mr. Smith, Mrs. Smith) and of the secondary vignette
person; 10 (6) the Social Security benefit ($SSB=$800, $1,200, $1,600 or $2,000); (7) the order of
the options shown (option with lump sum always shown first versus option with lump sum always
shown last); and (8) whether the consequence message first discusses the consequences of

10

The secondary vignette person (i.e., the vignette featured in the consequence message) was female if and only if
the primary vignette person was male, and vice versa. Similarly, the secondary vignette person was named Jones if
and only if the primary vignette person was named Smith, and vice versa. We did this to eliminate the possibility that
the consequence message affected advice on annuity choices for the primary vignette person by respondents inferring
the primary vignette person’s preferences or circumstances from information provided in the consequence message.
Because the consequence message used a different person, it can only have altered the advice by the respondent
through the respondent thinking differently about annuitization decisions rather the respondent knowing more about
the annuitant him- or herself.
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spending wealth down quickly or slowly. The latter four manipulations are intended to verify that
choices in the vignette that we assumed would be innocuous indeed do not matter for our results.
All randomizations occur across subjects and are mutually orthogonal. The options within each
randomization have equal probability of being selected.
2.5 Data on Cognition
To investigate how the ability to value annuities varies by cognitive ability, we merge the
data from our survey with existing data in the UAS, including a financial literacy survey (Lusardi
and Mitchell, 2014). We also include four subtests of the Woodcock-Johnson Test of Cognitive
Ability, a nationally normed test, with sub-tests including numeracy, number series, verbal
analogies, and picture vocabulary. The first two sub-tests measure numerical ability, and the
second two measure lexical ability. We standardize the financial literacy measure and each of the
four test scores: for the main analysis, we create a “cognition index” from these four tests and the
financial literacy measure by taking their first principal component. 11 In the robustness section,
we demonstrate the robustness of our main results to alternative measures of cognition.

3. Results
3.1 Baseline Sample and Randomization Check
As noted in Section 2.1, our baseline sample consists of respondents who answer both
annuity valuation questions and who have nonmissing values for the cognition and demographic
variables. We investigate whether the exclusion from the baseline sample due to missing data is
balanced across the two key treatment conditions (see Online Appendix Table A3), and we find
that neither the complexity treatment nor the consequence message treatment affects the likelihood

11

The Online Appendix provides more detail on the construction of the cognition index and the questions used.
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of a respondent failing to answer the annuity questions (p-values: 0.322 and 0.491, respectively).
The fraction of observations with missing demographic data is marginally significantly higher in
the complexity treatment than in the control condition, and the fraction with missing cognition
data is significantly higher in the complexity treatment than in the control condition. Since both
demographic and cognition data were collected prior to randomization, these findings cannot
logically be a consequence of the treatment, and we conclude they were a fluke of the
randomization. There are no significant differences in the fractions with missing demographics or
cognition data between the consequence treatment and the control condition.
We also test for balance on the control variables in the baseline sample by the two main
treatments (Panel B, Online Appendix Table A3). Of the four dozen tests of differences in means
across treatments for individual control variables, four are significant at the 10-percent level and
one at the 5-percent level. This is roughly what one would expect by chance. Jointly, the control
variables do not significantly predict the complexity treatment (p-value: 0.107) or the consequence
message treatment (p-value: 0.788).
3.2 Annuity Valuation Distributions and Summary Statistics
Figure 1 shows the distribution of buy valuations for the subsample in which the buy
valuation is asked first, and the distribution of sell valuations for the subsample in which the sell
valuation is asked first. By focusing on valuations when the question is asked first, we avoid any
influence of anchoring on a previously asked valuation question. The figure clearly shows that the
buy valuation is lower than the sell valuation throughout the distribution. Respondents advise our
hypothetical vignette individuals to buy an annuity that pays $100 per month for a median price of
$4,750 (s.e.: $180) but advise them to sell this annuity for a median price of $16,250 (s.e.: $543).
This represents a statistically significant difference (two-sample Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-
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sum test z-statistic=25.8, p-value<0.001). 12 The actuarially fair value of this annuity is roughly
$15,000 at a 3% real discount rate. 13
Rational individuals should place a similar value on a marginal increase and a marginal
decrease in the Social Security annuity. To examine the extent to which this holds in our data
where we ask about a $100 change in the Social Security annuity, we calculate for each respondent
the difference between the log sell price and the log buy price. Figure 2 shows the distribution of
this log difference for our baseline sample and highlights two facts. First, there are large
differences between buy and sell values at the individual level. Only about 10 percent of
respondents have a buy value that is equal to their sell value, and only 40 percent have a buy and
sell value that are within one log unit (i.e., within a factor of 2.72) of each other. In short,
deviations from the predictions of the rational model for buy and sell valuations of marginal
changes in Social Security benefits are substantial. Second, the distribution is not symmetric
around zero: 63% have sell valuations that strictly exceed their buy valuations, whereas buy
valuations strictly exceed sell valuations for about 27% of respondents. As Brown et al. (2017)
explain, people may worry that they might be taken advantage of when they trade a good that they
cannot value accurately. Accordingly, it can be a useful heuristic to be reluctant to trade such
goods, and only to sell them at a very high price (or buy them at very low price). Such a heuristic
predicts that sell prices exceed buy prices whenever it is difficult to accurately determine the value
of a good, as is the case with an annuity.
Status-quo bias (or an endowment effect) in the level of Social Security benefits cannot

12
Online Appendix Figure A1 shows the distributions of the buy and sell valuations in the entire baseline sample
which, unlike Figure 1, includes responses to valuation questions that followed an earlier valuation question. The
distributions are similar to those in Figure 1.
13
The average of the median buy valuation and the median sell valuation is lower than the actuarially fair value. Why
this is the case is not the focus of this paper’s investigation.
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explain why sell prices generally exceed buy prices. We elicit the sell price as the price for which
people would be willing to sell $100 of Social Security benefits that would be received on top of
the expected benefits. Someone with status-quo bias would put a low price on this $100 of benefits
because this amount is in addition to the status-quo level of benefits. Conversely, we elicit the buy
price as the price for which people would be willing to buy $100 of Social Security benefits that
would bring the total benefit level back to the expected level. Thus, someone with status-quo bias
would place a high price on these benefits because they would return the benefit level to the status
quo.
Any difference between the sell and buy price is a deviation from the prediction of the
rational model for marginal changes in Social Security benefits, whether the sell price differs from
the buy price due to the reluctance-to-trade heuristic offered by Brown et al. (2017), or for other
reasons. Accordingly, our measure of the deviation from rational decision-making is the absolute
value of the difference between the log buy price and the log sell price. We refer to this variable
as the spread and use it as our main outcome variable. Table 2 presents summary statistics of the
spread and Online Appendix Figure A2 plots its distribution. The spread is strictly positive for 90
percent of respondents, the median spread is 1.55, and the mean spread is 2.21. The table also
shows the components of the spread, namely the log buy price and the log sell price. Anchoring
mainly affects the buy price, which is significantly higher when asked after the (generally higher)
sell price is elicited. The spread is slightly higher when the sell question is asked first (2.27 versus
2.16), but this difference is only marginally significant (p-value: 0.079). Because the spread is
measured as an absolute log difference, an increase in the spread of 0.11 (from 2.16 to 2.27) can
be interpreted as the difference between the higher valued annuity and the lower valued annuity
increasing by 12 (= e0.11-1) percentage points.
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As we show in Online Appendix Table A4, demographic characteristics by themselves
explain about 11% of the variation in the spread among individuals in the control group, i.e., those
who see the “no added complexity” vignette and do not receive the consequence message. The
spread is significantly higher for females, non-Hispanic blacks, and those with lower education
levels. The most powerful predictor of the spread is the cognition index; those with higher levels
of cognition have significantly lower spreads. By itself, the cognition index can explain 16% of
the variation in the spread in the control group. If we regress the spread on both the cognition index
and the demographics, the R2 rises to 19%, and the cognition index is the strongest and most
significant predictor of the spread. The only demographic characteristic that is significant at the
5% level in this regression is the indicator for being Hispanic, which implies that Hispanics have
a lower spread than what would be predicted based on their cognition score and their other
demographic characteristics.
Our findings on the discrepancy between buy and sell valuations are in line with the results
of Brown et al. (2017), who asked respondents for how much they themselves would buy or sell
an annuity that paid them $100 per month. This similarity is reassuring, as it suggests that our
elicitation of valuation advice to a vignette person (rather than asking about respondents’ own
valuations) does not meaningfully alter the responses. A further similarity is that we also find that
the log buy and the log sell valuations are negatively correlated (correlation coefficient: -0.11, pvalue<0.001). 14 Our use of vignettes allows us to vary the complexity of the annuity by
experimentally altering the dispersion of ages of death, which would not be ethically feasible when
asking about an annuity tied to the respondent’s own life.

14

The negative correlation and the discrepancy between buy and sell prices are also consistent with the results of
Chapman, Dean, Ortoleva, Snowberg, and Camerer (2017), who elicit buy and sell prices for a monetary lottery in an
incentivized way and show that these prices are persistent within person over time and that the discrepancy between
buy and sell prices is not due to measurement error.
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3.3 Treatment Effects
In Table 3, we investigate our two main research questions. The first asks whether
complexity inhibits respondents’ ability to value an annuity stream. The second asks whether
narrow choice bracketing contributes to respondents’ difficulty in valuing the annuity. We measure
respondents’ inability to value an annuity by the spread between their sell and buy valuations
because the spread should be approximately zero for fully rational respondents. In all regressions,
we control for the experimental manipulations, 15 the cognition index, and a common set of control
variables (see Panel B, Online Appendix Table A3). In Table 3, we report only the coefficients of
interest (the full set of coefficient estimates is provided in Online Appendix Table A5).
The estimate in the first row of Column 1 shows that the complexity treatment increases
the sell-buy spread by 0.131, implying a 14 percent (=e0.131-1) increase in the ratio of the highervalued to the lower-valued annuity. To our knowledge, this is the first causal evidence that the
complexity of an annuity choice affects individuals’ reported annuity valuations. The fact that
complexity increases the spread between the buy and sell price indicates that complexity reduces
individuals’ ability to value an annuity accurately. 16 The next two columns show the separate
effects of the complexity treatment on the buy and sell price. While the estimates seem to indicate
that the complexity treatment primarily operates on the buy price, and hence it reduces the average
of the log sell and buy price, this is not a valid interpretation as we cannot reject that increase in
the sell price and the decrease in the buy price are the same in absolute value (p-value 0.302). We

We do not control for the order in which the two blocks of consequence message treatment were shown because
this variable is available for only half the sample. Within the half of the sample for which this order was randomized,
the order has no significant effect on the spread (p-value: 0.758).
16
While the spread is a measure of people’s inability to value an annuity accurately, it is not an overall measure of
their decision-making quality. For example, if people reduce the buy price and increase the sell price when they
recognize that they do not sufficiently understand how to value annuities, they will not only have a higher spread but
also mechanically become less likely to make an arbitrage mistake such as buying an annuity for more than its market
price.
15
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also evaluate whether the two types of complexity treatments (wide age range vs. added
information) have different effects on the spread. As reported in Online Appendix Table A6, this
is not the case (p-value: 0.646), so we therefore pool the two complexity treatments.
The second row of Table 3 shows the treatment effects of the consequence message. The
consequence message decreases the sell-buy spread by 0.141. This means that inducing
respondents to think about how to spend down savings during retirement causes them to report an
annuity sell price and a buy price that are closer together, which is consistent with being more able
to value annuities rationally. Apparently, the consequence message reduces the degree to which
respondents consider annuitization and the spending down of assets during retirement as two
separate decisions, a form of narrow choice bracketing. The consequence message does move the
buy and sell value closer by 15 percentage points, but this still leaves a substantial spread of 2.21
- 0.14 = 2.07 log units among respondents who received the consequence message. In short,
decision-making among those who receive the consequence message is still far from rational,
given that the spread remains well above zero. The next two columns show that the consequence
message has virtually no effect on the sell price but significantly increases the buy price. In fact,
it marginally significantly increases the average of the log buy and sell price (p-value 0.073),
suggesting that the consequence message not only increases the rationality of the annuity
valuations but also raises the levels. The latter finding is what one would expect when people
jointly consider the asset decumulation decision and how to value the lifetime income stream. In
particular, annuities remove uncertainty in consumption associated with asset decumulation in the
face of uncertain life spans.
The third row shows that the cognition index is a very strong predictor of the sell-buy
spread, such that a standard deviation increase in the cognition index narrows the sell-buy spread
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by 0.788. This underscores the conclusion that cognitive limitations play an important role in
people’s inability to value an annuity. This limitation had been previously established in a different
setting by Brown et al. (2017), but we now have causal evidence on two mechanisms by which
cognition affects people’s ability to value annuities: narrow choice bracketing and the complexity
of the annuity choice. The effect of cognition also allows us to put the magnitudes of the treatment
effects in perspective. Each of our two treatments, which by coincidence have the same absolute
magnitude of around 0.14, has the same effect on the spread as roughly a 17% (=0.14/0.79) of a
standard deviation change in cognitive ability.
The remaining rows examine the effects of our secondary randomizations. Consistent with
earlier findings in the literature, and indicative of less-than-fully rational decision-making, we find
significant effects of anchoring. When we ask the sell valuation first (which typically has a higher
valuation than the buy valuation), the respondent’s buy valuation is significantly higher, consistent
with the buy valuation being anchored on the sell valuation. We find no significant anchoring of
the sell price on the buy price when the latter is asked first. The starting values ($10,000, $20,000,
or $30,000) of the lump sum amount used in the annuity value elicitation procedure also have a
strong effect on the valuation reported: in fact, we can reject at the 1-percent level that the starting
value has no effect on the sell price or the buy price. The starting value has a similar effect on the
sell and buy price, resulting in no significant net effect on the spread. The remaining
randomizations cover the various choices we made in the design of the experiment (whether the
lump sum amount is the first or second choice, the monthly Social Security benefit amount, and
the name of the vignette person). We anticipated that these choices would be innocuous, but the
randomizations allow us to test whether outcomes indeed are insensitive to them. The last three
rows show that these choices have no significant effects on our main outcome variable, the sell-
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buy spread. With the exceptions of the effects of the vignette name and the benefit amount on the
buy price, these choices also do not affect the sell or buy price. 17
To alleviate concerns about multiple hypotheses testing, we also test whether our two key
experimental manipulations, the consequence message and the complexity treatment, are jointly
zero: we reject this hypothesis with a p-value of 0.0106. The p-value becomes 0.0256 if we do not
pool the complexity treatment, i.e., when we test that the consequence message, the wide-agerange complexity treatment, and the extra-information complexity treatment are jointly zero. If we
include all the secondary experimental manipulations in the joint test, we can reject that all
treatment effects are jointly zero with a p-value of 0.0098 when the complexity treatments are
pooled and with a p-value of 0.0148 when the complexity treatments are separated out.
What would annuity valuations be if we had an intervention sufficiently powerful to cause
the mean log sell price and the mean log buy price to be equal (so no deviation from rationality at
the mean)? We can get a rough answer to this question by extrapolating the effects of each of our
two main experimental interventions. The mean log difference between sell and buy price is 1.01
(see Figure 2), and the consequence message moves log sell and buy price closer by 0.122 (=0.1330.011, see columns 2 and 3 of Table 3). Thus, a treatment about 8 ≈ 1.01/0.122 times more

powerful than our current consequence message would close the gap between the mean log sell
and buy price. At that level of treatment, the median sell and buy price would be predicted to be

about $17,000. Similarly, we can extrapolate the complexity treatment, in the direction of making
the problem less complex, such that the sell and buy price coincide. This would require reducing

17
One might expect that people with an initially higher Social Security benefit place a lower value on a $100 change
in Social Security benefits, since they are already more highly annuitized. To test this, we run an alternative
specification in which the baseline Social Security benefit amount is included as a linear control instead of as a set of
dummy variables. Both the buy and sell value decline in the baseline amount of Social Security benefits. The effect is
not significant for the sell value (p-value 0.145), but there is a significant 2.5% decline in the buy value for each
additional $100 in baseline Social Security benefits.

24

complexity by about 5 times the amount of complexity added by our complexity treatment. The
resulting sell and buy price would then be predicted to be about $12,000. These point estimates
obviously rely on a substantial extrapolation, and therefore they should be taken as only
suggestive. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that a simple average of these two predicted valuations
at treatments sufficiently powerful to eliminate the discrepancy between the buy and sell price is
quite close to the actuarially fair value (of about $15,000).
3.4 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
In Table 4, we explore whether the impact of our two main treatments varies across
respondent subgroups. The first column examines heterogeneity in the effect of the complexity
treatment, and the second column investigates whether the consequence message has different
effects across subgroups. For each specification, we create two subgroups that are as close as
possible in size to each other in order to maximize statistical power.
The first two specifications examine interaction effects between our treatments. One might expect
that the complexity treatment has a greater impact on the spread when people engage in narrow
choice bracketing because they do not recognize how annuities help in the asset drawdown process.
In line with this prediction, the point estimate of the complexity treatment is larger for respondents
who receive no consequence message than for those who do; nevertheless, this difference is not
statistically significant (p-value: 0.408). The second specification is the flipside of the first, asking
whether the consequence message has a greater impact on persons exposed to the complexity
treatment. While the point estimates do go in this direction, this effect is again not significant (and
the p-value is the same as in the first specification by construction).
The third specification shows that that we do not detect significant heterogeneity in either
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treatment effect by level of cognition. 18 The last specification splits the estimates by the randomly
assigned level of Social Security benefits. A $100 change in Social Security benefits is closer to a
marginal change for someone with monthly benefits of $2000 than for someone with monthly
benefits of $800. The stability of treatment effects by level of benefits helps alleviate concerns that
the estimates are affected by the fact that the $100 change is not literally a marginal change.
Another way to address this concern is to not count small spreads as deviations from rational
behavior, which could arise when a $100 change is insufficiently marginal. In Online Appendix
Table A8, we do this by setting any spreads less than 0.50 log units equal to zero, and we find that
the estimated treatment effects are essentially unaffected.
3.5 Robustness
Online Appendix Table A8 examines the robustness of the two primary treatments to
different measures of cognition, to different ways of selecting the sample, to different sets of
controls, and to transformations of the outcome variable. We find that the results on the complexity
treatment are reasonably stable in magnitude but somewhat sensitive in terms of statistical
significance, which falls to marginal in 7 of the 18 specification checks and disappears in 2 of
them. This sensitivity can be traced largely to the fact that the cognition control, a very strong
predictor of the spread, was not balanced across the complexity treatment and control conditions.
Hence, having good controls for cognition is important for the results of the complexity treatment.
By contrast, the consequence message treatment is extremely robust and remains significant at the
5% level everywhere, except for one specification where it is significant at the 10% level.

Online Appendix Table A7 examines heterogeneity by gender, education, age, and income. In none of
these specifications do we find a difference in the treatment effect by demographic characteristic significant at the 5percent level or better, but we recognize that we have limited statistical power to detect even reasonably large
interaction effects.
18
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4. Conclusion
Annuities allow people to smooth consumption in retirement when facing an uncertain age
of death, yet annuity holdings are relatively low and only about 3 percent of individuals maximize
their annual Social Security annuity payouts by delaying claiming benefits until age 70 (Social
Security Administration, 2017). Although these decisions may be rational for some people, this
paper investigates whether behavioral factors impede people’s annuitization choices. We do so in
the context of a hypothetical choice experiment on a broadly representative sample of about 4,000
adults in the U.S. Such a setting confers two important advantages for our purposes. First, we can
measure deviations from rational decision-making by observing for each respondent both his
willingness to pay to forgo a small decrease in annuitization and his willingness to accept to forgo
a small increase in annuitization. Second, we can experimentally vary the complexity of the
annuitization decision. We also experimentally vary whether respondents are encouraged to jointly
consider the annuitization decision and the asset decumulation decision during retirement (thus
discouraging narrow choice bracketing), though this treatment could in principle also be applied
in non-hypothetical choice settings.
Our first main finding is that increasing the complexity of the annuity decision reduces
people’s ability to value the annuity. This decreased ability manifests itself as an increase in the
divergence of people’s sell and buy prices for a marginal change in annuitization. When the annuity
decision becomes more complex, people tend to become more reluctant to buy or sell annuities,
meaning they need greater inducements (lower buy or higher sell prices) to do so. Brown et al.
(2017) document that a reluctance to trade annuities, as measured by the sell-buy price spread, is
strongly negatively associated with cognitive ability, but of course, cognitive ability is not
randomly assigned. In our setting, we experimentally vary the complexity of the annuitization
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decision to obtain the first causal evidence that more complex annuitization decisions reduce
people’s ability to place a value on an annuity, as measured by the sell-buy spread. Hence, the
observed low level of annuity holdings can be traced, at least in part, to the cognitive challenges
of the complex task of valuing an annuity.
The second finding is that inducing people to think jointly about annuitization and how to
draw down assets during retirement increases their ability to place a value on an annuity. We
experimentally induce respondents to think about these decisions jointly by exposing them to a
“consequence message” which explains the result of spending down assets more slowly or more
rapidly during retirement. Respondents who think about this asset decumulation decision have a
smaller sell-buy spread for annuities than do respondents not exposed to the consequence message.
This finding suggests that narrow choice bracketing, which the consequence message counteracts,
is one behavioral mechanism impeding people from placing a rational value on annuities.
Our results on the roles of complexity and cognitive ability offer relatively little scope for
interventions to improve the quality of people’s annuitization decisions. Cognitive ability for any
given person is relatively immutable, as is the complexity of the annuitization decision. While this
complexity can be somewhat diminished by presenting the annuity information more
transparently, most of the complexity stems from having to consider how the annuity would alter
consumption streams in different states of the world, which is an inherently complex task. In
contrast, our finding on the role of narrow choice bracketing does offer scope for interventions to
improve people’s decision-making about annuities. In particular, people provide more rational
annuity valuations if they first consider the question of how to spend down non-annuitized wealth
during retirement. We therefore conclude that annuitization decisions can be improved by inducing
people to jointly consider annuitization and spending down non-annuitized wealth.
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Although our experimental setting is that of a hypothetical person facing an annuity
decision, we believe our results inform understanding of an important set of nearly universal
decisions. It is comforting that the distribution of buy-sell spreads found using these vignettes is
similar to the distribution found in earlier research in which individuals were making hypothetical
decisions for themselves (Brown et al., 2017). By using Social Security as our context, we are
confident that the lifelong income feature of Social Security is widely understood. We therefore
believe that these results potentially generalize to any situation in which an individual must place
an implicit value on a stream of annuity income, including whether to claim Social Security
benefits immediately upon retirement or to delay claiming, whether to accept a lump sum payment
in lieu of an annuity from an employer’s defined benefit pension plan, or whether to annuitize
assets in a defined contribution plan. We think it is plausible that the behavioral mechanisms that
drive the results in our setting would also operate in other markets, such as those for stocks,
options, and insurance, but whether this is indeed the case should be based on research in those
markets rather than on the extrapolation of our results.
Our results do not explain why average valuations are below actuarially fair levels, and
thus our results should not be interpreted as fully explaining the annuity puzzle. Indeed, we do not
believe that complexity and narrow choice bracketing are the only reasons that individuals are
reluctant to annuitize. Nevertheless, our paper adds to the evidence that behavioral factors
influence annuitization decisions, and it also provides causal evidence on two specific
mechanisms: narrow choice bracketing and cognitive limitations to dealing with complex
decisions. Naturally, our evidence on these two behavioral impediments to valuing annuities does
not preclude other mechanisms (c.f., Brown 2009). One avenue for future investigation will be to
quantify the welfare effects of behavioral deviations from rational decision-making in the context
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of annuitization decisions.
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Figures and Tables

Note: This figure plots the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the sell and the buy price for
a real annuity that pays out $100 a month. The sell prices are plotted for the 2,009 observations in
the baseline sample for which the sell question was asked first. The buy prices are plotted for the
remaining 2,015 observations in the baseline sample, i.e., those for which the buy question was
asked first. This avoids the influence of anchoring on a previously asked valuation question.
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Note: This figure plots the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the difference for each
respondent between the log sell price and the log buy price for a real annuity that pays out $100
per month. This difference is plotted for all 4,060 respondents in the baseline sample.
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Table 1: Experimental Design
Consequence Message Treatment
No consequence

Consequence

message

message

No added complexity

Vignette 1

Consequence message + Vignette 1

Complexity: Wide age range

Vignette 2

Consequence message + Vignette 2

Complexity: Added information

Vignette 3

Consequence message + Vignette 3

Complexity Treatment

Note: This table describes the 3x2 (vignette times consequence message) design of the experiment.
Online Appendix Table A2 reproduces the exact text of the three vignettes and of the consequence
message.
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Online Appendix for:
Behavioral Impediments to Valuing Annuities:
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Olivia S. Mitchell, and Anya Samek

Discussion of Robustness
Appendix Figure and Tables
Survey Instrument
Construction of the Cognition Index
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Discussion of Robustness
Online Appendix Table A8 examines the robustness of the two primary treatments to
different measures of cognition, to different ways of selecting the sample, to different sets of
controls, and to transformations of the outcome variable. The first row reproduces our baseline
specification from Column 1 of Table 3. Subsequent rows provide estimates on the two main
treatments in specifications identical to the baseline specification except for the change noted in
the row heading.
In Panel A, we examine robustness of our results using different measures of cognition
because cognition is a very strong predictor of the spread, and also because we saw in Online
Appendix Table A3 that the cognition index is marginally significantly higher for those who
received the complexity treatment than for those who did not. Rows (2) and (3) show that the point
estimates and standard errors are not at all sensitive to the details of the construction of the
cognition index: it does not matter whether we control for cognition by using the first principal
component of the five available cognition measures, taking a simple average of these five
measures, or entering all five measures separately. However, it is important for the significance of
complexity treatment that we exploit information from all the cognition tests. If we control only
for financial literacy, the point estimate on the complexity treatment declines moderately (by about
a fifth) but loses statistical significance. If we control only for the two numeracy measures or the
two verbal measures, the point estimate on the complexity treatment declines somewhat (by less
than a fifth) but becomes only marginally statistically significant. In contrast, the point estimate
on the consequence message is very stable, retaining statistical significance in all three
specifications that use a subset of the cognition measures. In the final row of Panel A, we add nine
additional controls for three types of cognitive mistakes, self-rated and objective knowledge about
Social Security, confidence in Social Security, experience with certain financial assets, and ability
and knowledge in retirement planning. The additional controls do not meaningfully change the
estimates of the two key experimental treatment effects.
Panel B examines robustness to different sample definitions. Row (8) includes observations
with missing demographic information, Row (9) includes observations with missing cognition
data, Row (10) includes observations with any missing information (demographic or cognition),
and Row (11) excludes the oversamples of Native Americans and Los Angeles county residents.
We include observations with missing values in the regression by dummying out missing values.
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While the coefficient estimate of the complexity treatment is reasonably stable, it becomes only
marginally significant once observations with missing cognition data are included or the
oversample is excluded. The estimate of the treatment effect of the consequence message remains
significant in all specifications of Panel B. Next, Panel C investigates robustness to excluding
various controls. Given the earlier finding that cognition is not quite balanced across complexity
treatments, it is not surprising that the complexity treatment is sensitive to having cognition
controls included. Excluding the controls for the secondary experimental manipulations makes the
complexity treatment only marginally significant. The four remaining estimates of Panel C are not
sensitive in magnitude or significance to the exclusion of controls.
Our module tells the respondent that the vignette person will have saved $100,000 for
retirement when making the annuity decision. Hence, unless there are other sources of savings, the
vignette person cannot logically pay more than $100,000 for an annuity. This implies that there is
an implicit topcode of $100,000 on the buy valuations, though respondents are permitted to give a
buy recommendation at a price in excess of $100,000, and 9% of them do so. Nevertheless, we
want to be sure that this implicit topcode does not drive key results. More generally, it is useful to
know that the results do not hinge on a few respondents with very high buy or sell valuations. In
the next specification check, therefore, we topcode all buy and all sell valuations at $100,000. Row
(15) of Panel D shows that the main results are not sensitive in terms of economic magnitude or
statistical significance to such topcoding. Similarly, Row (16) shows that the results are not
sensitive to topcoding the spread itself at the 90th percentile, rather than topcoding the underlying
sell or buy valuations. Row (17) shows that bottomcoding the buy and sell valuations at $1000
each results in somewhat smaller estimates that are significant at the 10% level. Apparently, the
low valuations given by some respondents do contribute to the significance of our treatment
effects.
Our finding in Table 4 that the treatment effects do not meaningfully vary by the level of
Social Security benefits may have already alleviated the concern that our estimates might be due
to the fact that a $100 change in monthly Social Security benefits is not literally a marginal change.
Another way to address this concern is to not count small spreads as deviations from rational
behavior, which could arise when a $100 change is insufficiently marginal. In Row 18, we do this
by setting any spreads less than 0.50 log units equal to zero, and we find that the estimated
treatment effects are essentially unaffected.
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We defined the spread as strictly positive both when the sell price is larger than the buy
price and vice versa. We do this because any difference is a deviation from rationality for a
marginal change in Social Security benefits. However, if our treatment effects operate by reducing
individuals’ reluctance to trade when their understanding increases (due to the consequence
message) or decreases (due to increased complexity), then they should operate predominantly on
people who are reluctant to trade, i.e., whose sell price exceeds their buy price. We test this
prediction in Row (19) by having a positive spread only for those who are reluctant to trade and
setting the spread to zero for everyone else. Row (19) confirms that the treatment effects operate
entirely on those who had sell prices exceeding buy prices, which is consistent with people’s
reluctance to trade being affected by the degree of their understanding. Reluctance to trade (so
having a sell price exceeding the buy price) is a sensible heuristic in response to difficulty in
valuing a product because it protects one from being taken advantage of by a better-informed party.
In contrast, having a buy price exceeding the sell price could cause one to lose money in trading if
the product is tradable (unlike the Social Security annuity). Thus, we would expect this latter group
to be more disadvantaged and to score lower on measures of cognition or financial
ability/experience. Online Appendix Table A10 indicates this is indeed the case.
Overall, Online Appendix Table A8 shows that the results on the complexity treatment are
reasonably stable in magnitude but somewhat sensitive in terms of statistical significance, which
falls to marginal in 7 of the 18 specification checks and disappears in 2 of them. This sensitivity
can be traced largely to the fact that the cognition control, a very strong predictor of the spread,
was not balanced across the complexity treatment and control conditions. Hence, having good
controls for cognition is important for the results of the complexity treatment. By contrast, the
consequence message treatment is extremely robust and remains significant at the 5% level
everywhere, except for one specification where it is significant at the 10% level.
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Online Appendix Figures and Tables

Note: This figure plots the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the sell and the buy price for a real annuity that
pays out $100 a month. The sell prices are plotted for all 4,060 observations in the baseline sample, unlike Figure 1,
where it was plotted only for those observations where the sell question was asked first. Similarly, the buy prices are
plotted all 4,060 observations in the baseline sample. Unlike Figure 1, some of the buy and sell prices may be
influenced by anchoring on a previously asked sell or buy valuation.
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Note: This figure plots the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the sell-buy spread, which is the absolute value
of the difference for each respondent between the log sell price and the log buy price for a real annuity that pays out
$100 per month. This absolute difference is plotted for all 4,060 respondents in the baseline sample.

42

Appendix Table A2: Text of the Vignettes and the Consequence Message
Panel A: Vignette Text
Complexity

No added complexity
(Vignette 1)

Complexity: Wide age range
(Vignette 2)

Complexity: Added information
(Vignette 3)

Vignettes
“Mr. Jones is a single, 60-year old man with no children. He
will retire and claim his Social Security benefits at 65. When he
retires, he will have $100,000 saved for his retirement, and he
will receive $[SSB] in monthly Social Security benefits. Based
on his current health and family history, doctors have told Mr.
Jones that he will almost certainly be alive at age 75 but almost
certainly will not live beyond age 85.”
“Mr. Jones is a single, 60-year old man with no children. He
will retire and claim his Social Security benefits at 65. When he
retires, he expects to have $100,000 saved for his retirement,
and expects to receive $[SSB] in monthly Social Security
benefits. Based on his current health and family history, doctors
have told Mr. Jones that he has an 80% chance of being alive at
age 70, a 50% chance of being alive at age 80, a 20% chance of
being alive at age 90, and a 10% chance of being alive at age
95.”
“Mr. Jones is a single, 60-year old man with no children. Social
Security rules state that you need at least 40 credits, or 10 years
of work, to qualify for Social Security – and Mr. Jones qualifies
since he has worked for 30 years. Since Mr. Jones was born in
1956, his full retirement age is 66 years and 4 months, but he is
eligible to start claiming starting at 62. He will retire and claim
his Social Security benefits at 65. When he retires, he will have
$100,000 saved for his retirement, and he will receive $[SSB] in
monthly Social Security benefits. Based on his current health
and family history, doctors have told Mr. Jones that he will
almost certainly be alive at age 75 but almost certainly will not
live beyond age 85.”
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Panel B: Text of the Consequence Message
Consequence Message Preceding Vignette
“First, we will show you a story about Mrs. Smith. Please pay close attention to the story, because at
the end we will ask you two questions about the story. You will receive an additional $1 for each
question you answer correctly.
Mrs. Smith is a single, 65-year old woman with no children, and she is as healthy as the typical 65year old woman. She just retired and receives her monthly Social Security check. She is talking with
her financial adviser on how to spend her substantial savings in retirement.
Her advisor explains that she could decide to spend down her savings relatively quickly. In this case,
she will be more likely to be able to enjoy her money during her lifetime. But she also runs a risk of
running out of money while alive and having to cut back on her spending as a result.
Her advisor explains that she could also decide to spend down her savings relatively slowly. In this
case, she will be less likely to run out of money. But now she runs a risk of not getting to enjoy all
her money during her lifetime.”
This story is followed by two 4-option multiple-choice questions to induce the respondent to pay
attention to the story. One question asks about the benefits and drawbacks of spending down wealth
quickly while the other asks about the benefits and drawbacks of spending down wealth slowly. See
the Survey Instrument in the Online Appendix for the exact wording of these questions.
The screen with the two test questions is followed by an advice question where the respondent is
asked to advise the vignette person how quickly to spend down her wealth. This question is asked to
induce the respondent to think about the problem of how to spend down wealth during retirement.
See the Survey Instrument in the Online Appendix for the exact wording of this question.
Note: Panel A provides the text of each of the 3 vignettes, with underlining added to emphasize the differences between the
vignettes. Panel B provides the text of the consequence message. Additionally, we include experimental variation in the
name and gender of the vignette person: Mr./Mrs., Smith/Jones, and the order of the last two paragraphs of the consequence
message (spending quickly first versus spending slowly first) are independently randomized across respondents. A different
name and gender was used in the consequence message from that in the vignette. Finally, there is experimental variation in
the monthly Social Security benefit value (SSB = $800, $1,200, $1,600, or $2,000).

44

Survey Instrument
Notes on the Survey Instrument
• Everyone sees both EV-Sell and EV-Buy questions in the same survey
• Randomizations are all orthogonal and across subjects. All options within each
randomization are selected with equal probability.
o The main manipulations consist of a 3x2 design: three vignettes that vary the
complexity, and whether or not the consequence message (see Table 1) is shown.
o The secondary manipulations consist of a 4x3x4x2x2 design that is orthogonal to
the main manipulations.
 There are four different versions for name and gender of the vignette person
to be advised on annuity decisions. This name and gender is randomized to
one of the following: Mr. Jones, Mrs. Jones, Mr. Smith, or Mrs. Smith. The
person featured in the consequence message has the opposite name and
gender from the vignette person in the annuity valuation questions.
 The starting value for lump-sum amounts is randomized at $10,000,
$20,000, or $30,000. For any given respondent, the same starting value is
used for the EV-Sell and EV-Buy questions.
 The baseline monthly Social Security Benefit, $SSB, is randomized to
$800, $1200, $1600, or $2000.
 Whether the choice option with the lump-sum amount ($LS) is shown first
or second is randomized. For each respondent, this is randomized once and
the same order is used for EV-Buy and EV-Sell.
 Whether EV-Buy is asked before or after EV-Sell is randomized.
 For the consequence message, it is randomized whether the paragraph on
the benefits and drawbacks of spending down retirement wealth quickly is
shown before or after the paragraph on the benefits and drawbacks of
spending down retirement slowly.
• Text in Arial are instructions to the programmers while text in Times New Roman is shown
to respondents. Text in italicized Arial denote variables and the respondents see the value
contained by that variable.
• Text between square brackets is replaced based on the randomization.
• Page breaks are shown by horizontal lines.
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Survey Instrument Text and Instructions for Understanding America Study #49
Invitation to the survey. When panelists logged on to their UAS account, they saw the
following message. If they clicked on the link in this message, they entered into UAS49.
This survey asks you to make decisions as if you were giving someone financial advice. You will then
play an insurance game. You will earn $10 for completion, and have a chance to win more.
In the following survey we want you to play the role of financial advisor. We will show you some
examples of persons who have to make a decision about money and we will ask you to help them make
the decision.

Consequence message treatment: Advisor explanations. Only people in the
consequence message treatment get this screen and the following two screens.
Respondents are randomized to see one of four vignette person names: Mr. Jones, Mrs.
Jones, Mr. Smith, or Mrs. Smith. The pronouns [he/she] and [his/her] should match the
gender of the consequence-message vignette person. Similarly, the word [man/women]
should match the gender of the vignette person.
First, we will show you a story about [Mr. Jones/Mrs. Jones/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Smith]. Please pay close
attention to the story, because at the end we will ask you two questions about the story. You will receive
an additional $1 for each question you answer correctly.
[Mr. Jones/Mrs. Jones/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Smith] is a single, 65-year old [man/woman] with no children, and
[he/she] is as healthy as the typical 65-year old [man/woman]. [He/She] just retired and receives [his/her]
monthly Social Security check. [He/She] is talking with [his/her] financial adviser on how to spend
[his/her] substantial savings in retirement.

Randomize whether either block 1 or block 2 is shown.
Block 1:

[His/Her] advisor explains that [he/she] could decide to spend down [his/her] savings relatively quickly.
In this case, [he/she] will be more likely to be able to enjoy [his/her] money during [his/her] lifetime. But
[he/she] also runs a risk of running out of money while alive and having to cut back on [his/her] spending
as a result.
[His/Her] advisor explains that [he/she] could also decide to spend down [his/her] savings relatively
slowly. In this case, [he/she] will be less likely to run out of money. But now [he/she] runs a risk of not
getting to enjoy all [his/her] money during [his/her] lifetime.

Block 2:

[His/Her] advisor explains that [he/she] could decide to spend down [his/her] savings relatively slowly. In
this case, [he/she] will be less likely to run out of money. But now [he/she] runs a risk of not getting to
enjoy all [his/her] money during [his/her] lifetime.
[His/Her] advisor explains that [he/she] could also decide to spend down [his/her] savings relatively
quickly. In this case, [he/she] will be more likely to be able to enjoy [his/her] money during [his/her]
lifetime. But [he/she] also runs a risk of running out of money while alive and having to cut back on
[his/her] spending as a result.
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Consequence message treatment: Test questions 1 and 2.
Remember, you will earn an extra $1 for each question you answer correctly on this page.
The financial advisor tells [Mr. Jones/Mrs. Jones/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Smith] that spending down [his/her]
savings more quickly:
o Increases the risk that [he/she] does not get to enjoy all of [his/her] money during [his/her]
lifetime.
o Decreases the risk that [he/she] runs out of money during [his/her] lifetime.
o Increases the risk that [he/she] runs out of money during [his/her] lifetime.
o None of the above.
The financial advisor tells [Mr. Jones/Mrs. Jones/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Smith] that spending down [his/her]
savings more slowly:
o Increases the risk that [he/she] runs out of money during [his/her] lifetime.
o Decreases the risk that [he/she] does not get to enjoy all of [his/her] money during [his/her]
lifetime.
o Increases the risk that [he/she] does not get to enjoy all of [his/her] money during [his/her]
lifetime.
o None of the above.

If a question is not answered, prompt once to answer the question, but move to next
screen if respondent still leaves the question blank.
Consequence message treatment: Question to induce respondent to think about
how to draw down savings during retirement
Now we are going to switch to a different type of question. Instead of asking you about facts, we are
going to ask your advice about what decisions [Mr. Jones/Mrs. Jones/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Smith] should
make. Unlike the previous questions, there is no right or wrong answer; we just want to know what you
think.
Recall [Mr. Jones/Mrs. Jones/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Smith], the retired, single, 65-year old [man/woman] with
no children. [He/She] is as healthy as the typical 65-year old [man/woman].
How quickly should [he/she] spend [his/her] savings?
o Spend [his/her] savings by age 70. [he/she] can spend a large amount each year, but [he/she] will
have to cut back if [he/she] lives beyond 70. If [he/she] dies before 70, [he/she] will not have
enjoyed all of [his/her] savings.
o Spend [his/her] savings by age 80. [he/she] can spend a moderate amount each year, but [he/she]
will have to cut back if [he/she] lives beyond 80. If [he/she] dies before 80, [he/she] will not have
enjoyed all of [his/her] savings.
o Spend [his/her] savings by age 90. [he/she] can spend a modest amount each year, but [he/she]
will have to cut back if [he/she] lives beyond 90. If [he/she] dies before 90, [he/she] will not have
enjoyed all of [his/her] savings.
o Spend [his/her] savings by age 100. [he/she] can spend a small amount each year, and [he/she]
will have to cut back if [he/she] lives beyond 100. If [he/she] dies before 100, [he/she] will not
have enjoyed all of [his/her] savings.

This is the end of the screens shown for the consequence message.
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Complexity Treatment. Respondents are randomized to one of the three vignettes
shown below: Vignette 1 (corresponding to treatment “No added complexity”), Vignette 2
(corresponding to treatment “Complexity: Wide age range”) or Vignette 3 (corresponding
to treatment “Complexity: Added information”). The name in the complexity vignette below
is different than the name shown in the consequence-message vignette above. Similarly,
the gender of the person in the complexity vignette is different from the gender of the
person in the consequence-message vignette. The scalar variable SSB is randomized to
800, 1200, 1600, or 2000.
In the next few questions, we are going to ask you to give some advice to [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs.
Jones/Ms. Jones] for when [she/he] retires. You will be happy to know that whatever advice you give
[Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones], [she/he] will not owe any taxes on the amounts shown and
[her/his] benefits will keep up with inflation. There is no right or wrong answer; we just want to know
what you think.

Vignette 1 (“No added complexity”):

[Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] is a single, 60-year old [woman/man] with no children.
[She/He] will retire and claim [her/his] Social Security benefits at 65. When [she/he] retires, [she/he] will
have $100,000 saved for [her/his] retirement, and [she/he] will receive $[SSB] in monthly Social Security
benefits. Based on [her/his] current health and family history, doctors have told Mr. Smith that [she/he]
will almost certainly be alive at age 75 but almost certainly will not live beyond age 85.

Vignette 2 (“Complexity: Wide age range”):

[Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] is a single, 60-year old [woman/man] with no children.
[She/He] will retire and claim [her/his] Social Security benefits at 65. When [she/he] retires, [she/he]
expects to have $100,000 saved for [her/his] retirement, and expects to receive $[SSB] in monthly Social
Security benefits. Based on [her/his] current health and family history, doctors have told Mrs. Jones that
[she/he] has an 80% chance of being alive at age 70, a 50% chance of being alive at age 80, a 20% chance
of being alive at age 90, and a 10% chance of being alive at age 95.

Vignette 3 (“Complexity: Added information”):

[Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] is a single, 60-year old [woman/man] with no children.
Social Security rules state that you need at least 40 credits, or 10 years of work, to qualify for Social
Security – and [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] qualifies since [she/he] has worked for 30
years. Since [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] was born in 1956, [her/his] full retirement age
is 66 years and 4 months, but [she/he] is eligible to start claiming starting at 62. [She/He] will retire and
claim [her/his] Social Security benefits at 65. When [she/he] retires, [she/he] will have $100,000 saved for
[her/his] retirement, and [she/he] will receive $[SSB] in monthly Social Security benefits. Based on
[her/his] current health and family history, doctors have told [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/ Mrs. Jones/Ms.
Jones] that [she/he] will almost certainly be alive at age 75 but almost certainly will not live beyond age
85.

Initializations for EV-Sell and EV-Buy. Whether the EV-Buy questions or the EV-Sell
questions are shown first is randomized.
The scalar variable LS_STARTVALUE is randomized to 1, 2, or 3.
The values in the matrices LS_LOW, LS_MED, and LS_HIGH are listed at the very end
of this document.
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Initialization of the matrix LS_AMT:
If LS_STARTVALUE ==1
Set the 16x5 matrix LS_AMT=LS_LOW
Elseif LS_STARTVALUE ==3
Set the 16x5 matrix LS_AMT=LS_HIGH
Else
Set the 16x5 matrix LS_AMT=LS_MED
Endif
EV-Sell Questions
Set the scalar j=1
Set the scalar ROW=1
For j=1 to 5
This is the start of the loop for EV-Sell questions.
The text for each iteration of the loop is shown on a new screen.
If j = 1, Display:
If EV-Sell is asked before EV-Buy:

Suppose that the Social Security Administration is considering a new policy that
gives people more choice in how they want to receive their benefits. As part of
this policy, [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] is asked to make a
choice between two money amounts.

Else

What should [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] do?
Now consider a different way of giving people more choice in how they want to
receive their benefits. As part of this policy, [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs.
Jones/Ms. Jones] is asked to make a choice between two money amounts.

Endif
Else, Display:

Now we ask you the same question but with a different amount for the one-time payment.
What should [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] do?

Endif
The order of the two options shown is randomized once for each respondent.
The order remains the same for the EV-Sell and EV-Buy questions shown to a
given respondent. The third appearance of the word “receive” (i.e., when it
appears after the underlined word “and”) in the text below is shown in bold if and
only if EV-Sell is asked after EV-Buy.
o
o

Receive a Social Security benefit of $[SSB+100] per month starting at age 65.
Receive [her/his] expected Social Security benefit of $[SSB] per month and receive a
one-time payment of $[LS_AMT[ROW,j ]] from Social Security at age 65.

If the respondent does not select any option, the respondent is prompted once to
answer this question. If the respondent still doesn’t give an answer, the variable j
is set to 5, so that we get skipped out of this loop.
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If Respondent selects the option that does not contain the one-time payment:
Set ROW=ROW+2^(4-j)]
Note: this will increase the size of one-time payment in the next iteration,
so it makes the option that does not contain the one-time payment less
attractive.
Endif
Set j=j+1
This is the end of the loop for the EV-Buy questions.
Vignette reminder. The complexity vignette is shown again, but now preceded by the
word “Remember, ”.
Vignette 1 (“No added complexity”):

Remember, [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] is a single, 60-year old [woman/man] with no
children. [She/He] will retire and claim [her/his] Social Security benefits at 65. When [she/he] retires,
[she/he] will have $100,000 saved for [her/his] retirement, and [she/he] will receive $[SSB] in monthly
Social Security benefits. Based on [her/his] current health and family history, doctors have told Mr. Smith
that [she/he] will almost certainly be alive at age 75 but almost certainly will not live beyond age 85.

Vignette 2 (“Complexity: Wide age range”):

Remember, [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] is a single, 60-year old [woman/man] with no
children. [She/He] will retire and claim [her/his] Social Security benefits at 65. When [she/he] retires,
[she/he] expects to have $100,000 saved for [her/his] retirement, and expects to receive $[SSB] in
monthly Social Security benefits. Based on [her/his] current health and family history, doctors have told
Mrs. Jones that [she/he] has an 80% chance of being alive at age 70, a 50% chance of being alive at age
80, a 20% chance of being alive at age 90, and a 10% chance of being alive at age 95.

Vignette 3 (“Complexity: Added information”):

Remember, [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] is a single, 60-year old [woman/man] with no
children. Social Security rules state that you need at least 40 credits, or 10 years of work, to qualify for
Social Security – and [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] qualifies since [she/he] has worked
for 30 years. Since [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] was born in 1956, [her/his] full
retirement age is 66 years and 4 months, but [she/he] is eligible to start claiming starting at 62. [She/He]
will retire and claim [her/his] Social Security benefits at 65. When [she/he] retires, [she/he] will have
$100,000 saved for [her/his] retirement, and [she/he] will receive $[SSB] in monthly Social Security
benefits. Based on [her/his] current health and family history, doctors have told [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/
Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] that [she/he] will almost certainly be alive at age 75 but almost certainly will not
live beyond age 85.

EV-Buy Questions
Set the scalar j=1
Set the scalar ROW=1
For j=1 to 5
This is the start of the loop for EV-Buy questions.
The text for each iteration of the loop is shown on a new screen.
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If j = 1, Display:
If EV-Buy is asked before EV-Sell:

Suppose that the Social Security Administration is considering a new policy that
gives people more choice in how they want to receive their benefits. As part of
this policy, [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/ Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] is asked to make a
choice between two money amounts.

Else

What should [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/ Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] do?
Now consider a different way of giving people more choice in how they want to
receive their benefits. As part of this policy, [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/ Mrs.
Jones/Ms. Jones] is asked to make a choice between two money amounts.

Endif
Else, Display:

Now we ask you the same question but with a different amount for the one-time payment.
What should [Mrs. Smith/Mr. Smith/ Mrs. Jones/Ms. Jones] do?

Endif
The order of the two options shown is randomized once for each respondent.
The order remains the same for the EV-Sell and EV-Buy questions shown to a
given respondent. The word “payment” in the text below is shown bold if and
only if EV-Buy is asked after EV-Sell.
o
o

Receive a Social Security benefit of $[SSB-100] per month starting at age 65.
Receive [her/his] expected Social Security benefit of $[SSB] per month and make a onetime payment of $$[LS_AMT[ROW,j]] to Social Security at age 65.

If the respondent does not select any option, the respondent is prompted once to
answer this question. If the respondent still doesn’t give an answer, the variable j
is set to 5 so that we get skipped out of this loop.
If Respondent selects the option that does contain the one-time payment:
Set ROW=ROW+2^(4-j)]
Note: this will increase the size of one-time payment in the next iteration,
so it makes this option with the payment less attractive.
Endif
Set j=j+1
This is the end of the loop for the EV-Buy questions
End of survey instrument for experiment on annuity valuations. The remainder of
UAS49 consisted of approximately 24 screens with information and questions about
insurance decisions that were collected for a different project.
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The Values of the Matrices for the Lump-Sum Amounts
The following tables show lump-sum amounts for three different starting values: low,
medium and high, which are randomized as mentioned above.
10,000

4,000

2,000

7,000

1,000

500
1,500

Row 1
Row 2

3,000

2,500

Row 3

3,500

Row 4

4,750

Row 5

6,250

Row 6

7,750

Row 7

9,250

Row 8

12,500

Row 9

17,500

Row 10

22,500

Row 11

27,500

Row 12

35,000

Row 13

50,000

Row 14

80,000

Row 15

200,000

Row 16

5,500

8,500

30,000

20,000

15,000

25,000

60,000

40,000

100,000

Col. 1

Col. 2

Col. 3

Col. 4

Col. 5

We put the values of this in the 16x5 matrix LS_LOW. The ith row and jth column of this matrix is
denoted by LS_LOW[i,j]
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20,000

4,000

2,000

10,000

1,000

500
1,500

Row 1
Row 2

3,000

2,500

Row 3

3,500

Row 4

5,500

Row 5

8,500

Row 6

12,500

Row 7

17,500

Row 8

22,500

Row 9

27,500

Row 10

35,000

Row 11

50,000

Row 12

70,000

Row 13

90,000

Row 14

150,000

Row 15

500,000

Row 16

7,000

15,000

60,000

30,000

25,000

40,000

100,000

80,000

200,000

Col. 1

Col. 2

Col. 3

Col. 4

Col. 5

We put the values of this in the 16x5 matrix LS_MED. The ith row and jth column of this matrix is
denoted by LS_MED[i,j]
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30,000

10,000

4,000

20,000

2,000

1,000
3,000

Row 1
Row 2

7,000

5,500

Row 3

8,500

Row 4

12,500

Row 5

17,500

Row 6

22,500

Row 7

27,500

Row 8

32,500

Row 9

37,500

Row 10

45,000

Row 11

55,000

Row 12

70,000

Row 13

90,000

Row 14

150,000

Row 15

500,000

Row 16

15,000

25,000

60,000

40,000

35,000

50,000

100,000

80,000

200,000

Col. 1

Col. 2

Col. 3

Col. 4

Col. 5

We put the values of this in the 16x5 matrix LS_HIGH. The ith row and jth column of this matrix is
denoted by LS_HIGH[i,j]
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Construction of the Cognition Index
The cognition index is the first principal component of the 5 scores of different tests
administered at different times in the UAS: one score for financial literacy and four scores for
four standard cognition tests.
Financial Literacy
The financial literacy score is calculated by standardizing the number of correct answers to the
14 financial literacy questions in UAS1. These questions are derived from Lusardi and Mitchell
(2014). The 14 questions are:
1. Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5
years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to
grow: more than $102, exactly $102, less than $102?
a. More than $102
b. Exactly $102
c. Less than $102
d. I don’t know
2. Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 20% per year and
you never withdraw money or interest payments. After 5 years, how much would you
have on this account in total?
a. More than $200
b. Exactly $200
c. Less than $200
d. I don’t know
3. Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was
2% per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy more than, exactly the same as, or
less than today with the money in this account?
a. More than today
b. Exactly the same as today
c. Less than today
d. I don’t know
4. Assume a friend inherits $10,000 today and his sibling inherits $10,000 but 3 years from
now. Who is richer today because of the inheritance?
a. My friend
b. His sibling
c. They are equally rich
d. I don’t know
5. Suppose that in the year 2020, your income has doubled and prices of all goods have
doubled too. In 2020, will you be able to buy more, the same or less than today with your
income?
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a.
b.
c.
d.

Buy more than today
Buy the same as today
Buy less than today
I don’t know

6. Which of the following statements describes the main function of the stock market?
a. The stock market helps to predict stock earnings
b. The stock market results in an increase in the price of stocks
c. The stock market brings people who want to buy stocks together with those who
want to sell stocks
d. None of the above
e. I don’t know
7. Which of the following statements is correct?
a. Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw money in the first year
b. Mutual funds can invest in several assets, for example invest in both stocks and
bonds
c. Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past
performance
d. None of the above
e. I don’t know
8. If the interest rates (rise/fall), what should happen to bond prices? *Respondents are
randomly selected to be asked about rise or fall.
a. They should rise
b. They should fall
c. They should stay the same
d. I don’t know
9. Do you think the following statement is true? Buying a (single company stock/stock
mutual fund) usually provides a safer return than a (single company/stock mutual fund).
*Respondents are randomly selected to be asked about single company or stock market
mutual fund.
a. True
b. False
c. Don’t know
10. Do you think that the following statement is true or false? (Stocks/bonds) are normally
riskier than (stocks/bonds). *Respondents are randomly selected to be asked about stocks
or bonds.
a. True
b. False
c. Don’t know
11. Considering a long period (for example 10 or 20 years), what normally gives the highest
return?
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a.
b.
c.
d.

Savings accounts
Bonds
Stocks
I don’t know

12. Normally, which asset described below displays the highest fluctuations over time:
savings accounts, bonds or stocks?
a. Savings accounts
b. Bonds
c. Stocks
d. I don’t know
13. When an investor spreads his or her money among different assets, does the risk of losing
a lot of money increase, decrease, or stay the same?
a. Increase
b. Decrease
c. Stay the same
d. I don’t know
14. Is the following statement true? Housing prices in the US can never go down.
a. True
b. False
c. I don’t know
Numeracy
Numeracy consists of 8 items taken from Weller et al. (2013). The test scores for this sub-test
were derived within the UAS using a two-parameter logistic Item Response Theory (IRT) model.
The test was administered in UAS1. The resulting score is standardized.
1. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times
do you think the die would come up as an even number?
[ Slider from 0 to 1,000 ]
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%. What is
your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each
buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS?
[ Slider from 0 to 1,000 ]
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000.
What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car?
[ Slider from 0 to 100 ]
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4. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get the
disease out of 1,000?
[ Slider from 0 to 1,000 ]
5. If the chance of getting a disease if 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having how
much of a percent chance of getting the disease?
[ Slider from 0 to 100 ]
6. Suppose you have a close friend who has a lump in her breast and must have a
mammogram. Of 100 women like her, 10 of them actually have a malignant tumor and
90 of them do not. Of the 10 women who actually have a tumor, the mammogram
indicates correctly that 9 of them have a tumor and indicates incorrectly that 1 of them
does not have a tumor. OF the 90 women who do not have a tumor, the mammogram
indicates correctly that 80 of them do not have a tumor and indicates incorrectly that 10
of them do have a tumor. The table below summarizes all of this information.
Actually has a
tumor
Does not have a
tumor
Totals

Tested positive
9

Tested negative
1

Totals
10

10

80

90

19

81

100

Imagine that your friend tests positive (as if she had a tumor), what is the likelihood that
she actually has a tumor?
[ Randomized between: (i) Answer box accepting numerics with decimals and (ii) answer
box accepting answers in the format “<number> out of < number>” ]
7. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost?
[ Answer box accepting numerics with decimals ]
8. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover
half of the lake?
[ Answer box accepting numerics with decimals ]
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Number Series, Picture Vocabulary and Verbal Analogies
Each of the three sub-tests – number series, picture vocabulary and verbal analogies – were taken
from the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Cognitive Abilities (Mather and Jaffe, 2016). Each
measure consisted of 15 items, which were scored as either correct or incorrect. The numberseries test was administered in UAS42, the picture-vocabulary test in UAS43, and the verbalanalogies test in UAS44.
The test scores for each of these three sub-tests were derived within the UAS using a twoparameter logistic Item Response Theory (IRT) model. The resulting scores are standardized.
Due to copyright, we are unable to reprint the specific questions here.
References
Lusardi, Annamaria, and Olivia S. Mitchell. 2014. “The Economic Importance of Financial
Literacy: Theory and Evidence.” Journal of Economic Literature 52(1): 5–44.
Mather, N, Jaffe, L.E. (2016). Woodcock-Johnson IV: Reports, Recommendations, and
Strategies. Jossey-Bass: Hoboken, NJ.
Weller, J. S., Dieckman, N. F., Tusler, M., Mertz, C. K., Burns, W. J., and E. Peters. (2013).
“Development and Testing of an Abbreviated Numeracy Scale: A Rasch Analysis Approach.”
Journal of Behavioral Decision-Making 26: 198–212.

59

